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An epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in a FMD-free country with large exports 
of livestock and livestock products would result in profound economic damage. This 
could be reduced by rapid and efficient control of the disease spread. The objectives 
of this study were to estimate the economic impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak 
in Denmark based on changes to the economic assumptions of the model, and to 
investigate whether the control of an FMD epidemic can be improved by combining 
the enlargement of protection or surveillance zones with pre-emptive depopulation or 
emergency vaccination. The stochastic spatial simulation model DTU-DADS was used 
to simulate the spread of FMD in Denmark. The control strategies were the basic EU 
and Danish strategy, pre-emptive depopulation, suppressive or protective vaccination, 
enlarging protection or surveillance zones, and a combination of pre-emptive depopu-
lation or emergency vaccination with enlarged protection or surveillance zones. Herds 
are detected either based on basic detection through the appearance of clinical signs, 
or as a result of surveillance in the control zones. The economic analyses consisted of 
direct costs and export losses. Sensitivity analysis was performed on uncertain and 
potentially influential input parameters. Enlarging the surveillance zones from 10 to 
15 km, combined with pre-emptive depopulation over a 1-km radius around detected 
herds resulted in the lowest total costs. This was still the case even when the different 
input parameters were changed in the sensitivity analysis. Changing the resources for 
clinical surveillance did not affect the epidemic consequences. In conclusion, an FMD 
epidemic in Denmark would have a larger economic impact on the agricultural sector 
than previously anticipated. Furthermore, the control of a potential FMD outbreak in 
Denmark may be improved by combining pre-emptive depopulation with an enlarged 
protection or surveillance zone.
Keywords: foot-and-mouth disease, control, simulation model, surveillance
inTrODUcTiOn
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting ruminants and pigs 
(1–3), and an epidemic may have a large economic impact on FMD-free countries and regions 
(4, 5). In an FMD-free country with large exports of livestock and livestock products, it is likely 
that the relevance of an outbreak would not be restricted to the domestic market of the affected 
country, but it might also affect the international market (6). Trade restrictions would be imposed 
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to minimize the risk of disease spread to other countries (6). 
The OIE allows affected countries to resume exports 3 months 
after the destruction of the last infected or vaccinated herd 
(7). However, if protective vaccination is used, export cannot 
be resumed until 6 months after the end of the campaign (7), 
and not before all vaccinated animals are tested and confirmed 
negative for the virus (7). The European Union (EU), on the 
other hand, allows affected countries to export to other mem-
ber states from regions confirmed to be free of the disease (8). 
Nevertheless, it is expected that products will be sold with a 
price reduction, in order to prevent extra storage challenges 
and costs. Furthermore, a short export ban on all livestock 
products would be imposed at the beginning of the outbreak 
to prevent disease spread to other member states. During the 
2007 UK epidemic, the EU imposed restrictions on exports of 
livestock and livestock products from the UK to other member 
states (9).
Simulation modeling of FMD is widely used as a decision 
support tool in contingency planning for FMD awareness and 
preparedness (10–14). During the 2001 UK outbreak, simulation 
models were used to help the veterinary authorities control the 
spread of the disease (15–17).
Earlier work has predicted that pre-emptive culling would 
often be the optimal strategy to control a hypothetical FMD 
outbreak in Denmark, given the assumptions (13). Suppressive 
vaccination (vaccinated animals are culled) resulted in slightly 
higher total costs than pre-emptive depopulation. Both strate-
gies are comprised the slaughter of a large number of healthy 
animals. Protective vaccination, on the other hand, does not 
involve slaughtering healthy animals and was predicted to 
give the shortest epidemic duration and the lowest number 
of affected herds. However, the largest economic damage was 
predicted to follow protective vaccination due to export losses 
(13). More recent work has shown that enlarging the protection 
zone from 3 to 5 km or the surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km 
has a good potential to control FMD (18). However, the model 
included optimistic assumptions regarding exports of Danish 
products to the EU markets, which could have hidden the true 
magnitude of the positive impact of zone enlargement. The 
authors recommended investigating the impact of combining 
enlarged zones with pre-emptive culling or emergency vac-
cination, taking into account realistic assumptions regarding 
exports of Danish livestock products (18). To the best of our 
knowledge, the impact of combining pre-emptive depopulation 
or emergency vaccination with enlarged protection or surveil-
lance zones on the epidemiological and economic consequences 
of an FMD epidemic has not been investigated before. This 
information can be used to inform decision-makers on optimal 
control strategies for potential FMD outbreaks in EU member 
states.
The objectives of this study were to estimate the economic 
impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak in Denmark based on 
changes to the economic assumptions of the DTU-DADS model, 
and to investigate the epidemiological and economic impact of 
strategies combining pre-emptive depopulation or emergency 
vaccination with enlargement of the protection or the surveil-
lance zones on the control of a hypothetical epidemic.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
study Population
Information on Danish herds constituted the core of the model. We 
used data from the Danish Central Husbandry Register (CHR), 
extracted for the period 1st October 2006 to 30th September 2007, 
as previously explained (13), in order to compare the results of 
this study to our previous findings (13). The data included 23,550 
cattle herds, 11,473 swineherds, and 15,830 sheep and goatherds. 
For each herd, data included a unique identity number (CHR 
number), herd type, UTM geo-coordinates, number of animals, 
and rate of animal movements from the herd per day. Herds 
were grouped into three types: cattle, swine, and sheep and goats. 
Cattle herds were categorized as dairy or non-dairy herds. Swine 
herds were categorized into 19 different types based on their 
production type and specific pathogen-free1 (SPF) status (19). 
Sheep and goats were grouped and treated equally (referred to as 
sheep herds throughout the paper), since Denmark has a limited 
number of goat herds, and the disease dynamics are expected to 
be similar to those of sheep herds. When a farm included several 
animal species, each species was treated as a separate herd in 
the model and was given a separate identification number, but 
registered on the same location and with the same CHR number. 
Information about markets was also available, including the 
UTM geo-coordinates.
The number of animal movements per herd was summarized 
over 1  year, using data from the movement database between 
October 2006 and September 2007. The total count of movements 
of each animal type (cattle, weaners, sows, and sheep) for each 
individual herd, divided by the days counted (365), was used 
as lambda (λ) in a Poisson distribution simulating the move-
ments of the individual herd. Each movement reflected a batch 
of animals, but without defining the number of animal within 
the batch. The distance for movements was calculated from the 
movement databases for each movement type as the Euclidean 
distance. One distribution of distances was used for each move-
ment type. We simulated five different types of direct movements 
of animals (cattle, weaners, sows, sheep/goats, and movements 
to/from Bornholm2) and two types of market movements (to and 
from markets). For each type of herd, the probability of sending 
animals to other types of herds was calculated based on animal 
movement data. These probabilities were used to select the receiv-
ing herds for each simulated movement of animals. One batch of 
animals was regarded as one movement.
The input parameters of the model were based on Danish 
data; the literature and personal communication with experts are 
described in detail in earlier publications (13, 18) and in Table S1 
in Supplementary Material.
1 Specific pathogen free herds are regularly checked for freedom from a number 
of diseases according to the health declaration of the program. A herd can be free 
from all or some of the seven diseases included in the declaration system. The 
owner of the herd is obliged to inform the SPF company and buyers about the 
health status in the herd and to follow a certain set of rules regarding biosecurity 
(http://spfsus.dk/en)
2 Bornholm is a Danish island located 150 km east of Zealand in the Baltic sea and 
has therefore a different movement patterns than the other parts of the country.
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The simulation Model
The model simulated the hypothetical spread of FMD between 
herds in Denmark using the dynamic spatial simulation model 
DTU-DADS (version 0.150) that runs in the freeware R (20). 
The model is an upgrade from DTU-DADS (version 0.14) 
(18), which included updating the economic assumptions that 
simulates export losses and updating detection parameters 
following re-evaluation by experts as shown in Table S2 in 
Supplementary Material. The major processes within the 
model are disease spread and detection, implementation of 
control strategies, which must satisfy the EU and national 
legislations, implementation of optional control strategies 
(including pre-emptive depopulation and emergency vaccina-
tion), culling of detected herds. Disease spread and control are 
explained in the subsequent sections. Culling, vaccination, and 
clinical surveillance are all based on the available resources. 
For example, herds to be culled are set in a queuing system 
and are culled when resources are available. Vaccination and 
clinical surveillance are implemented in a similar manner. 
Herds are detected either based on basic detection through 
the appearance of clinical signs or as a result of surveillance 
in the control zones.
Disease spread
The simulation starts in one herd (the index herd). Other studies 
have shown that the index herd influences the size and duration 
of the epidemic (19, 21). In order to include the variation caused 
by different index herds, we randomly selected 1,000 cattle herds 
as index herds. Each index herd was run in 1 iteration, resulting 
in 1,000 iterations per model run (scenario).
The spread of infection between herds was simulated through 
seven spread mechanisms: (1) direct animal movement between 
herds; (2) abattoir trucks; (3) milk tankers; (4) veterinarians, 
artificial inseminators, and/or milk controllers (medium-risk 
contact); (5) visitors, feedstuff, and/or rendering trucks (low-risk 
contact); (6) markets, and (7) local spread. Movements of live 
animals and animals for slaughter were simulated as probabilities 
for the individual herd. Based on actual movement data, a prob-
ability of movements per day was calculated for each herd. The 
individual daily movement rate was used as λ in a Poisson distri-
bution to represent the number of movements per day. Similarly, 
the probability of abattoir deliveries per day was calculated based 
on actual data from herds, and used in a Poisson distribution to 
simulate the number of movements to the abattoir per day from 
the infectious herd. Thereafter, the number of herds visited by an 
abattoir truck on the way to the abattoir following a visit to an 
infected herd was estimated from a Poisson distribution with a 
λ dependent on the herd type. Abattoir trucks collect animals of 
the same species. The collection of milk, as well as medium- and 
low-risk contacts were simulated for the different herd types, each 
described by a λ in a Poisson distribution (13). Since markets 
in Denmark are restricted to cattle only, an infection spreading 
from a market can initially only affect cattle herds. The spread 
via markets would occur from the direct movement of infected 
animals to susceptible herds, or via people and vehicles that had 
been in contact with the infected animals.
Local spread was defined as infection due to unexplained 
reasons potentially contributing to the spread of disease within 
short distances, such as limited airborne spread, rodents, birds, 
and flies. Local spread was simulated as a small probability of 
infecting neighboring herds within a 3-km radius around the 
infected herds (11, 13). The 3-km radius was based on Gibbens 
et al. (22). Herds located on the same farm had a 95% daily chance 
of infection when one herd was infected (13).
The period from when a herd started to show clinical signs 
until it was detected was dependent on the herd type. For exam-
ple, cattle herds were detected faster than sheep herds, because 
some sheep do not show clinical signs.
Basic control strategy
Following detection of the first infected herd, a set of control 
measures was applied, representing the basic scenario (EU and 
Danish control regulations). These included (1) depopulation, 
cleaning, and disinfection of detected herds; (2) a 3-day national 
standstill on animal movements in the country; (3) implementa-
tion of a 3-km protection zone and a 10-km surveillance zone 
around the detected herds, in which movements between herds 
as well as movements in and out of the zones were restricted 
and herds were surveyed at least one (surveillance zone) or two 
(protection zone) times before lifting the restrictions; and (4) 
backward and forward tracing of contacts to and from detected 
herds. Herds that had received animals from a detected herd were 
also depopulated and disinfected, and in cases involving other 
kinds of contacts, the herds were surveyed. When a herd was 
subject to surveillance, the animals were inspected for clinical 
signs of FMD, and sheep herds were serologically tested. The daily 
surveillance capacity was set to 450 herds (18).
The daily depopulation capacity was set at 2,400 ruminants 
and 4,800 pigs. These numbers were calculated based on the 
number of people available for culling, the time needed to cull 
and the number of animals in the herds. Further details are given 
in the Supplementary Material of Boklund et al. (13). Detected 
herds had higher priority for depopulation than traced herds. If 
several herds were located on the same farm, all herds on the farm 
were depopulated when one herd was detected.
alternative control strategies
We investigated the effect of seven different control strategies, 
described as different scenarios. Extra control measures were 
always applied on top of the basic scenario. The scenarios were 
(1) the basic scenario (as previously described); (2) pre-emptive 
depopulation, including depopulation of herds within a 1-km 
radius around detected herds; (3) suppressive vaccination,3 
including emergency vaccination of herds within a 1- or 2-km 
radius around detected herds; (4) protective vaccination,4 includ-
ing emergency vaccination of herds within a 1- or 2-km radius 
around detected herds; (5) enlargement of the protection zone, 
from 3 to 5 km; (6) enlargement of the surveillance zone from 
10 to 15 or 20 km, and finally (7) combined strategies, including 
3 Emergency vaccination followed by depopulation when resources are available.
4 Emergency vaccination where vaccinated animals can be differentiated from 
infected animals, and where they are kept until slaughter.
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pre-emptive depopulation, suppressive, or protective emergency 
vaccination combined with either enlarging the protection zone 
from 3 to 5 km or enlarging the surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km. 
Vaccination and depopulation were initiated after the detection 
of 10 infected herds, or after 14 days following the first detection 
of an infected herd, as recommended by the Danish Veterinary 
Authorities. The emergency vaccination scenario with the radius 
resulting in the lowest total costs was used in the scenarios where 
emergency vaccination was combined with enlarged protection 
or surveillance zones. The daily animal vaccination capacity was 
assumed to be 50,000 ruminants and 60,000 pigs (13). Before vac-
cination, cattle and pig herds were clinically surveyed and sheep 
herds were also serologically surveyed.
costs and losses
The costs and losses of the epidemics were calculated, as presented 
previously (13). Briefly, the direct costs were related to surveil-
lance, depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, empty housing, 
compensation, and national standstill (e.g., losses incurred by 
feed and transport companies and slaughter houses). The indirect 
costs included losses incurred from restrictions on exports to EU 
and non-EU countries (export loss). The method of calculating 
the direct costs was not changed in the current analysis. However, 
the calculation of indirect costs was changed by adding: (1) a 
complete export ban (block) on Danish exports of swine products 
and beef to the EU market for 14–28 days. It was assumed that 
storage capacity would be available for approximately 7–14 days 
of production, and it was therefore assumed that the loss would be 
equivalent to 1–21 days of production. A program evaluation and 
review technique (PERT) distribution with a minimum of 1, a 
mode of 14, and a maximum of 21 days was used to represent this 
lost export to EU member states. In addition, (2) a price reduction 
for pork and beef sold in the EU market from uninfected areas. 
A PERT distribution with a minimum of 5%, a mode of 6%, and 
a maximum of 10% was used to represent the price reduction. 
Total costs were calculated per iteration, and their summaries 
were thereafter estimated based on the 1,000 iterations.
sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity of model results toward input parameters was 
investigated. The influence of local spread, low-risk contacts, 
and basic detection was examined, as these parameters were 
previously shown to have a major impact on our model predic-
tion (13). The input parameters were increased or decreased 
by 25%, using different control scenarios. Furthermore, we 
investigated the influence of an increase from 25 to 50% in 
the price reduction on exports of pork and beef to non-EU 
countries, and a prolonged time to regain the free status from 
3 to 6 months, though only in the basic scenario. Additionally, 
resources for clinical surveillance were changed from 450 to 
300 or 600 herds per day only for the basic scenario, in order to 
study the epidemic consequences. For the sensitivity analysis, 
all parameters kept unchanged, but the one which was explored.
statistical analysis
For all scenarios, the epidemiological and economic results 
were compared to the basic as well as to the optimal scenario. 
The optimal scenario was considered to be the scenario with the 
lowest total costs of the epidemics. The epidemiological results 
included duration of epidemics, and the numbers of infected, 
depopulated, and vaccinated herds, whereas economic results 
included the total costs and losses. To test the statistical differ-
ences between the scenarios, we used the Wilcoxon rank sum test, 
run in the statistical software R (20). A p-value threshold of <0.05 
was used to determine statistical significance.
resUlTs
Basic control strategy
The median duration of an epidemic in cattle herds was 67 days, 
with 17 and 185  days as 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively 
(Table 1). They resulted in 86 (13–368) infected herds, leading to 
total costs of €1,087 (768–1,766) million (Table 1).
In certain scenarios, the alternative control strategy was initi-
ated after the detection of at least 10 infected herds. The detection 
of 10 infected herds was achieved in 968 out of 1,000 iterations. 
These 10 herds were detected within a median value of 4 days 
following first detection, though this varied with 5th and 95th 
percentiles of 1–14  days, respectively. This indicates that the 
initiation of the alternative control strategy in these scenarios, 
would usually start 4 days following first detection, but it could 
start as early as 1 day following first detection or after 14 days 
following first detection.
alternative control strategies
An increase in the size of the protection zone from 3 to 5 km did 
not decrease the size, duration, and total costs of the epidemics, 
whereas an increase in the size of the surveillance zone from 10 to 
15 km decreased the size and duration of the epidemics, but not 
the total costs (Table 1). All other alternative scenarios resulted 
in shorter epidemic duration and fewer infected herds than the 
basic scenario (Table 1).
Furthermore, combinations of pre-emptive depopulation with 
enlarged protection or surveillance zones resulted in lower total 
costs of the epidemics compared to the basic scenario (Table 1). 
The lowest total costs (optimal scenario) were estimated when 
pre-emptive depopulation was initiated following the detection 
of 10 infected herds, and combined with enlarged surveillance 
zones (Dep10H-SZ15). Nevertheless, there were no statistically 
significant differences in the total costs between this scenario 
and scenarios with depopulation initiated after detection of 10 
infected herds (Dep10H), or depopulation initiated after detec-
tion of 10 infected herds and combined with enlargement of the 
protection zone (Dep10H-PZ5). Nevertheless, Dep10H-SZ15 
resulted in the minimum number of infected herds and a smaller 
variation in epidemic duration and numbers of infected herds 
when compared to the other scenarios.
The scenario (Dep10H-SZ15) reduced the median epidemic 
duration by 33 days, the median number of infected herds by 39 
herds, and the median total costs by €202 million when com-
pared to the basic scenario (Table 1). As expected, the number of 
slaughtered animals increased significantly (p-value <0.05) in the 
scenarios where pre-emptive depopulation and suppressive vac-
cination were used, compared to the other scenarios (Figure 1). 
TaBle 1 | epidemiological and economic consequences of simulated FMD epidemics in Denmark under different control scenarios, when epidemics 
were initiated cattle herds.
scenario epidemic duration infected herds Depopulated herds Vaccinated herds Total costs (€ × 106)
Basic 67 (17–185) 86 (13–368) 86 (13–367) – 1,087 (768–1,766)
PZ5 67 (18–184)a 81 (11–373)a 81 (11–372)a – 1,089 (770–1,754)a
SZ15 59 (18–156) 74 (12–314) 74 (12–311) – 1,052 (773–1,807)a
Dep14D 42 (16–78) 60 (12–184) 151 (17–509) – 937 (761–1,187)
Dep10H 35 (15–75) 49 (12–143) 167 (20–542) – 888 (752–1,135)
VTK14D-1 km 51 (17–104) 69 (12–233) 69 (12–231) 124 (5–481) 996 (767–1,337)
VTK10H-1 km 47 (19–97) 60 (13–188) 60 (13–187) 157 (10–553) 972 (769–1,285)
VTK14D-2 km 46 (17–88) 63 (12–207) 63 (12–204) 335 (19–1,219) 981 (768–1,299)
VTK10H-2 km 41 (19–81) 53 (13–170) 53 (13–168) 410 (40–1,432) 941 (776–1,233)
VTL14D-1 km 51 (18–100) 69 (12–221) 69 (12–219) 122 (6–463) 1,159 (920–1,475)
VTL10H-1 km 49 (19–97) 62 (13–202) 62 (12–200) 161 (11–578) 1,129 (928–1,455)
VTL14D-2 km 44 (17–79) 60 (12–188) 60 (11–184) 282 (16–1,108) 1,106 (920–1,382)
VTL10H-2 km 40 (17–75) 53 (11–160) 53 (11–158) 400 (24–1,359) 1,077 (919–1,349)a
Dep14D-PZ5 40 (18–78) 57 (12–176) 142 (18–471) – 925 (763–1,185)
Dep10H-PZ5 36 (16–72) 49 (12–139) 162 (18–512) – 888 (752–1,126)
Dep14D-SZ15 38 (18–72) 56 (12–169) 133 (18–450) – 914 (767–1,220)
Dep10h-sZ15 34 (16–68) 47 (12–126) 156 (22–483) – 885 (755–1,168)
VTK14D-2 km-PZ5 45 (18–87) 62 (12–199) 61 (12–197) 319 (23–1,137) 972 (777–1,290)
VTK10H-2 km-PZ5 42 (18–79) 55 (12–166) 54 (12–164) 427 (26–1,412) 958 (768–1,225)
VTK14D-2 km-SZ15 43 (18–78) 59 (12–184) 58 (12–183) 283 (21–1,083) 961 (775–1,371)
VTK10H-2 km-SZ15 37 (18–75) 50 (12–149) 50 (12–147) 380 (32–1,237) 935 (769–1,279)
VTL14D-2 km-PZ5 45 (18–81) 62 (12–186) 62 (12–186) 297 (19–1,041) 1,072 (907–1,316)
VTL10H-2 km-PZ5 38 (18–73) 51 (11–152) 51 (11–151) 375 (22–1,227) 1,071 (911–1,360)a
VTL14D-2 km-SZ15 43 (18–78) 59 (12–184) 58 (12–183) 283 (21–1,083) 1,104 (920–1,489)
VTL10H-2 km-SZ15 37 (18–75) 50 (12–149) 50 (12–147) 380 (32–1,237) 1,072 (919–1,382)a
The basic scenario represents the EU and Danish control regulations (Basic), combined with the enlargement of the protection zone to 5 km (PZ5) and the surveillance zone to 
15 km (SZ15), pre-emptive depopulation (Dep) over a 1-km radius around detected herds, and suppressive (VTK) or protective (VTL) emergency vaccination over a 1- or 2-km radius 
around detected herds. Pre-emptive depopulation and vaccination were initiated following the detection of 10 infected herds (10H) or after 14 days (14D) from the detection of the 
first infected herd. Scenarios combining pre-emptive depopulation over 1 km, suppressive or protective emergency vaccination over 2 km and enlarged protection or surveillances 
zones are also included. Results are presented as a median with 5th and 95th percentiles. The optimal scenario (lowest total cost) is in bold. All variables were statistically 
significantly different (p-value <0.05) from the corresponding variable in the basic control strategy, unless superscripted by “a”.
aNot significantly different from the corresponding variable in the basic scenario (p-value ≥0.05).
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The vast majority of the economic losses were due to export losses 
(Figure 2).
sensitivity analysis
Increasing or decreasing the low-risk contacts has a substantial 
impact on the model prediction of the total costs of the epidemics 
for the different control scenarios (Figure 3). Similarly, changes 
in the probabilities of local spread and disease detection were 
highly influential, as shown in Figures  4 and 5, respectively. 
The differences in total costs between the basic scenario and the 
scenarios where the frequency of low-risk contacts, probabilities 
of local spread and disease detection were changed were statisti-
cally significant (p-value <0.05). Still, depopulation following the 
detection of 10 infected herds combined with a surveillance zone 
of 15 km (Dep10H-SZ15) remained the control scenario with the 
lowest total costs.
Changing the resources for clinical surveillance from 450 to 
300 or 600 herds per day resulted in a marginal and statistically 
insignificant change in the epidemic duration, the number of 
infected and depopulated herds and the total costs of the epidem-
ics (Table 2). Increasing the delay on the export of products to 
non-EU countries from 3 to 6 months following the depopulation 
of the last detected herd increased the total costs of epidemics dra-
matically (Figure 6). Similarly, when the export loss on products 
meant for export to non-EU countries, but sold in the EU market 
was increased from 25 to 50%, and an extra €175 million (based 
on median values) was lost (Figure 6).
DiscUssiOn
Pre-emptive depopulation following the detection of 10 infected 
herds, combined with enlarging the surveillance zone from 10 to 
15 km (Dep10H-SZ15) resulted in the lowest total costs (Table 1). 
Interestingly, the total costs of the epidemics using this scenario 
did not significantly differ from those using pre-emptive depopu-
lation following the detection of 10 infected herds combined with 
enlarging the protection zone from 3 to 5  km (Dep10H-PZ5). 
Nevertheless, combining the enlargement of the protection zone 
resulted in the smallest 95th percentile of the total costs of the 
epidemics (Table 1), making this scenario as an insurance against 
large epidemics.
Clinical surveillance within the protection and surveillance 
zones is useful for the early detection of infected herds in order 
to limit disease spread (18). Since the virus is able to spread over 
long distances through animal movements and indirect contacts 
(23), enlarging the surveillance zone is expected to limit this 
spread due to the restrictions on animal movements and indirect 
contacts, and clinical surveillance is expected to lead to earlier 
FigUre 2 | Median direct costs and export losses using different strategies to control 1,000 simulated FMD epidemics in Denmark, all initiated in 
cattle herds. The basic scenario represents the EU and Danish control measures (Basic), combined with the enlargement of the protection zone to 5 km (PZ5) and 
the surveillance zone to 15 km (SZ15), pre-emptive depopulation (Dep) over a 1-km radius around detected herds, and suppressive (VTK) or protective (VTL) 
emergency vaccination over a 1- or 2-km radius around detected herds. Pre-emptive depopulation and vaccination were initiated either following the detection of 10 
infected herds (10H) or after 14 days (14D) from the detection of the first infected herd. Scenarios combining pre-emptive depopulation over 1 km, suppressive or 
protective emergency vaccination over 2 km and enlarged protection or surveillances zones are also included.
FigUre 1 | numbers of slaughtered animals using different strategies 
to control 1,000 simulated FMD epidemics in Denmark, all initiated in 
cattle herds. The basic scenario represents the EU and Danish control 
measures (Basic), combined with the enlargement of the protection zone to 
5 km (PZ5) and the surveillance zone to 15 km (SZ15), pre-emptive 
depopulation (Dep) over a 1-km radius around detected herds, and 
suppressive (VTK) or protective (VTL) emergency vaccination over a 1- or 
2-km radius around detected herds. Pre-emptive depopulation and 
vaccination were initiated either following the detection of 10 infected herds 
(10H) or after 14 days (14D) from the detection of the first infected herd. 
Scenarios combining pre-emptive depopulation over 1 km, suppressive or 
protective emergency vaccination over 2 km and enlarged protection or 
surveillances zones are also included.
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detection. A high herd density will lead to more local spread, 
and larger zones will most likely be effective in decreasing the 
epidemic size and duration in such areas. However, a high herd 
density will also result in a large number of surveyed herds, 
which can cause problems in  situations with limited resources 
for surveillance. Herd density is relatively high in Denmark, but 
compared to other countries such as the Netherlands or certain 
areas in Germany (e.g., lower Saxony), the herd density is rela-
tively low. Yet, the positive effect of enlarging the protection or 
surveillance zones was still observed. We therefore speculate that 
enlarging these zones may also have a positive effect in countries 
with high herd density areas.
Pre-emptive depopulation has frequently been used to control 
FMD outbreaks (6) and has been predicted to considerably limit 
disease spread in other simulation studies, given the assumptions 
of the models (11–13, 16, 24). Enlarged surveillance zones have 
been predicted to reduce the epidemic duration and number of 
affected herds, whereas enlarged protection zones were predicted 
to cause minimal losses (18). The combination of pre-emptive 
depopulation with zone enlargement, as investigated in the 
current study, may be a good strategy in controlling an FMD 
epidemic in Denmark.
Initiating pre-emptive depopulation following the detection 
of 10 infected herds was frequently predicted to be more profit-
able than waiting 14 days following the first detection, since 10 
infected herds were often detected within this timeframe (see 
Basic Control Strategy under the Section “Results”), and thus 
disease spread would be controlled earlier than 14  days. This 
timeframe of 14 days was chosen following the discussion with 
the veterinary authorities, where it was noted that extra control 
FigUre 3 | Total costs using different strategies to control 1,000 
simulated FMD epidemics in Denmark, all initiated in cattle herds, 
when the probability of low-risk contacts are decreased (white boxes) 
or increased (gray boxes) by 25%. The basic scenario represents the EU 
and Danish control regulations (Basic), combined with the enlargement of the 
protection zone to 5 km (PZ5) and the surveillance zone to 15 km (SZ15), 
pre-emptive depopulation (Dep) over a 1-km radius around detected herds, 
and suppressive (VTK) or protective (VTL) emergency vaccination over a 
2-km radius around detected herds. Pre-emptive depopulation and 
vaccination were initiated following the detection of 10 infected herds (10H). 
Scenarios combining pre-emptive depopulation over 1 km, suppressive or 
protective emergency vaccination over 2 km and enlarged protection or 
surveillances zones are also included.
FigUre 4 | Total costs using different strategies to control 1,000 
simulated FMD epidemics in Denmark, all initiated in cattle herds, 
when the probability of local spread is decreased (white boxes) or 
increased (gray boxes) by 25%. The basic scenario represents the EU and 
Danish control regulations (Basic), combined with the enlargement of the 
protection zone to 5 km (PZ5) and the surveillance zone to 15 km (SZ15), 
pre-emptive depopulation (Dep) over a 1-km radius around detected herds, 
and suppressive (VTK) or protective (VTL) emergency vaccination over a 
2-km radius around detected herds. Pre-emptive depopulation and 
vaccination were initiated following the detection of 10 infected herds (10H). 
Scenarios combining pre-emptive depopulation over 1 km, suppressive or 
protective emergency vaccination over 2 km and enlarged protection or 
surveillances zones are also included.
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measures (especially emergency vaccination) would, if necessary, 
only be implemented 14 days following the detection of the first 
epidemic, as previously indicated (23).
Emergency vaccination was used to control the spread of FMD 
in the Netherlands in 2001 (21). The currently available FMD vac-
cines do not provide complete protection and require a number of 
days before immunity is built (25), making pre-emptive depopu-
lation a cheaper choice than emergency vaccination (Table  1). 
Furthermore, the delay on export when protective emergency 
vaccination is applied is two times longer than the delay when 
pre-emptive depopulation or suppressive vaccination is applied. 
This will result in extra losses for countries with large exports, 
which would disqualify protective vaccination as a feasible 
control strategy for FMD when compared to the other strategies. 
Nevertheless, this strategy prevents the mass slaughter of a large 
number of animals (Figure 1).
Previous work (24) has shown that a radius of 40 km would 
be the optimum vaccination radius in Denmark. In the current 
study, the implemented zones for pre-emptive depopulation and 
vaccination were chosen following thorough discussions with the 
veterinary authorities and the industry. Due to the relatively high 
density of herds in the country, larger zones would result in a 
substantial number of animals to be culled in the case of pre-
emptive depopulation and suppressive vaccination, and in very 
large areas restricted from exporting, as well as a considerable 
number of herds included in the surveillance zones. Therefore, 
the authors, in agreement with experts from the Veterinary and 
Food Administration and from the industry, did not find the use 
of large zones as suggested by Tildesley and Keeling to be realistic 
in Denmark.
Neither an increase nor a decrease in the surveillance capacity 
significantly affects the total costs of the epidemics (Table  2). 
However, when we compare the 95th percentiles of the basic 
scenario and the scenario with reduced resources, there appears 
to be an effect of reduced surveillance capacity. This is consistent 
with previous findings, which showed that available resources for 
clinical surveillance in Denmark are generally sufficient to fulfill 
the regulations, but that reducing the resources might (in the 
extremes) result in large economic damage (18).
As previously shown (13), export losses are the driving force of 
the total costs of the simulated Danish epidemics (Figure 2). We 
included a complete block on export of swine products and beef 
to the EU market after the first confirmation of FMD as a new 
feature in the economic analysis, compared to earlier work (13). 
During the 2007 UK FMD epidemic, the EU prohibited exports 
of live animals and meat products from the UK, in order to pre-
vent disease spread to other member states (9). Approximately 
70% of the total exports of Danish swine products are exported to 
the EU market (26); hence, an epidemic in Denmark might be a 
risk for other member states. Recent work has in fact shown that 
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given the livestock-related contact patterns between Denmark 
and other EU member states, an epidemic of African swine fever 
in Denmark would have a high probability of spreading to other 
member states (27). The assumption regarding an EU block on 
Danish exports was closely discussed with the veterinary authori-
ties and the industry, and an export loss to the EU market for a 
short period was considered to be realistic. This period would 
include the necessary time until disease spread is contained, or 
free regions are demarked.
Furthermore, we assumed that products exported to the EU 
market from free regions (after the EU export block) would be 
sold with a price reduction varying between 5 and 10%, with 6% 
as the most likely value. The price reduction is based on the extra 
supply caused by exports intended for the non-EU market being 
sold in the EU market. This extra supply would affect the general 
price level of swine products. Furthermore, each different swine 
product is normally sold on the market that pays the highest 
price for the product. The limited access to these special markets 
during an FMD outbreak would result in a general reduction in 
the price of these products. In addition, during an FMD outbreak, 
the Danish industry would want to ensure the sale of its products, 
due to the country’s large swine production limiting the storage 
capacity. Therefore, lowering the prices is expected to facilitate 
the sale of the products.
As previously mentioned, the model assumes that products 
intended for export to non-EU markets would be sold in the EU 
market with a price reduction of 25%. In order to make the sale 
of these products attractive in the EU market, a high price reduc-
tion of 25% may be necessary. A higher price reduction (50%) 
would result in extra losses (Figure  6). This was also the case 
when the delay in regaining the free status was increased from 3 
to 6 months (Figure 6).
Although these assumptions have been thoroughly discussed 
with the veterinary authorities and the industry, it is almost 
FigUre 5 | Total costs using different strategies to control 1,000 
simulated FMD epidemics in Denmark, all initiated in cattle herds, 
when the probability of basic detection is decreased (white boxes) or 
increased (gray boxes) by 25%. The basic scenario represents the EU and 
Danish control regulations (Basic), combined with the enlargement of the 
protection zone to 5 km (PZ5) and the surveillance zone to 15 km (SZ15), 
pre-emptive depopulation (Dep) over a 1-km radius around detected herds, 
and suppressive (VTK) or protective (VTL) emergency vaccination over a 
2-km radius around detected herds. Pre-emptive depopulation and 
vaccination were initiated following the detection of 10 infected herds (10H). 
Scenarios combining pre-emptive depopulation over 1 km, suppressive or 
protective emergency vaccination over 2 km and enlarged protection or 
surveillances zones are also included.
TaBle 2 | sensitivity analysis on resources for clinical surveillance.
Basic-survey 
450 herds/day
Basic-survey 
300 herds/day
Basic-survey 
600 herds/day
Epidemic duration 
(days)
67 (17–185) 66 (18–192)a 64 (18–178)a
Infected herds 86 (13–368) 82 (12–375)a 81 (12–353)a
Depopulated herds 86 (13–367) 82 (12–372)a 81 (12–251)a
Total costs (€ × 106) 1,087 
(768–1,766)
1,084 
(765–1,939)a
1,074 
(767–1,681)a
The influence on the predicted durations, number of infected and depopulated herds 
and total costs in simulated FMD epidemics in Denmark. Simulations were run with 
the basic scenario, representing the EU and Danish control regulations, and resources 
were changed from 450 to 300 or 600 herds per day. Epidemics were initiated in cattle 
herds. Results are presented as a median with 5th and 95th percentiles.
aNot significantly different from the corresponding variable in the basic scenario (p-value 
≥0.05).
FigUre 6 | Total costs of simulated FMD epidemics using the basic 
control scenario, which represents the eU and Danish control 
measures, when the free status was regained 3 months (basic) or 
6 months (extraDelay) after the depopulation of the last detected 
herd, and when products intended for export to non-eU countries 
were sold in the eU market with a price reduction of 25% (basic) or 
50% (extraPR). Epidemics were initiated in cattle herds.
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impossible to predict the reaction of the markets to Danish live-
stock products during and after an FMD epidemic in Denmark. 
EU countries are obligated to follow the EU regulations, but 
non-EU member states might not obey the OIE regulations, 
and might demand a longer time to do thorough risk analyses 
before re-opening their markets. Politics may also play a role 
in making this decision. Nevertheless, an FMD outbreak in a 
country with large exports of livestock and livestock products 
is expected to be highly detrimental to the livestock industry of 
that country (6).
The model prediction of the optimal control strategy seems to 
be consistent, whether influential parameters were increased or 
decreased (as shown in Figures 3–5), and can therefore provide 
robust predictions. Nevertheless, conclusions of simulation mod-
els are highly depend on the epidemiological parameters of the 
model and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
The results of the current study complement our previous work 
(13) and show that the economic impact of an FMD outbreak in 
Denmark may be much larger than initially predicted (13). An 
outbreak initiated in cattle herds and controlled using the basic 
control strategies was initially predicted to cost between approxi-
mately €550 and €650 million (13), but the current estimation is 
€1,087 million. Furthermore, our earlier work (18) showed that 
enlarging the protection zone could improve the control of an 
FMD epidemic. The current study shows that control of an FMD 
outbreak may be further improved by combining pre-emptive 
depopulation with an enlarged surveillance or protection zone. 
The results can be used to inform decision-makers on new meth-
ods to improve the control of FMD in countries with large exports 
of livestock and livestock products, such as Denmark.
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